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Abstract	  
This	  is	  a	  mini	  review	  on	  the	  recent	  developments	  in	  the	  intriguing	  field	  of	  neuroeconomics	  that	  falls	  within	  the	  
overlap	  between	  a	  number	  of	  contributing	  disciplines	  in	  the	  social	  and	  natural	  science	  –	  economics,	  psychology,	  
neuroscience	  and	  medical	  imaging	  being	  the	  major	  ones.	  We	  start	  by	  providing	  a	  brief	  background	  of	  neoclassical	  
approaches	  to	  studying	  decision-­‐making	  and	  work	  our	  way	  through	  the	  development	  of	  the	  field	  with	  increasing	  
inputs	   from	   the	   behavioral	   sciences	   till	   the	   current	   point	   when	   the	   extra-­‐economic	   inputs	   to	   the	   study	   of	  
economic	   decision-­‐making	   are	   no	   longer	   coming	   only	   from	   the	   cognitive	   psychologists	   but	   also	   from	   the	  
computational	   neuroscientists	   and	   neuro-­‐physiologists.	   We	   explore	   the	   methodological	   challenges	   and	  
opportunities	  of	  this	  new,	  inter-­‐disciplinary	  field	  of	  intellectual	  enquiry;	  and	  conclude	  by	  considering	  some	  of	  the	  
major	  roadblocks	  that	  the	  field	  is	  faced	  with	  and	  finally	  positing	  some	  interesting	  future	  research	  directions.	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1	  	  	  	  Introduction	  
Utility	  theory	  and	  the	  rational	  choice	  model	  have	  dominated	  economic	  decision-­‐making	  for	  the	  better	  part	  of	  last	  
two	   hundred	   years.	   Before	   delving	   into	   the	   nature	   of	   neuroeconomics,	   it	   is	   desirable	   to	   briefly	   discuss	   the	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conventional	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  economic	  decision-­‐making	  that	  it	  purports	  to	  replace	  (or	  at	  least	  heavily	  
complement).	  The	  rational	  choice	  model	  (hereafter	  RCM)	  has	  dominated	  formal	  theorizing	  of	  economic	  decisions	  
over	  a	  substantial	  length	  of	  time	  and	  have	  even	  staged	  a	  comeback	  of	  sorts	  in	  recent	  times	  (Green	  and	  Shapiro,	  
1996).	  The	  basic	  RCM	  rests	  on	  some	  fundamental	  premises	  –	  individuals	  have	  a	  number	  of	  alternative	  courses	  of	  
action	   which	   may	   be	   ranked	   in	   their	   order	   of	   preference	   and	   there	   is	   an	   inherent	   logic	   in	   such	   preference	  
ordering	  such	  that	  if	  an	  alternative	  is	  preferred	  over	  another	  one	  then	  a	  third	  alternative	  that	  is	  preferred	  over	  
the	  former	  will	  also	  be	  preferred	  over	  the	  latter.	  Following	  such	  an	  objective,	  complete	  and	  transitive	  ranking	  of	  
the	  available	  alternative	  courses	  of	  action	  according	  to	  his/her	  revealed	  preferences;	  the	  individual	  would	  select	  
the	  one	   that	   gets	   the	  highest	   rank	   (Kreps,	   1990).	   Preferences	   are	   formally	   represented	   via	   a	   “utility	   function”	  
which	  again;	  has	  to	  have	  certain	  fundamental	  characteristics.	  If	  an	  action	  has	  a	  positive	  result	  then,	  intuitively,	  an	  
individual	  is	  expected	  to	  repeat	  that	  action	  as	  he/she	  would	  want	  to	  enjoy	  more	  and	  more	  of	  the	  “positives”	  and	  
by	  doing	  so	  his/her	   level	  of	  utility	  would	  therefore	  rise.	  So	  utility	   functions	  need	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  slope	   i.e.	  a	  
curve	   sketched	   by	   such	   a	   function	   would	   have	   to	   be	   rising	   to	   the	   right	   of	   the	   origin.	   However	   too	   much	   of	  
anything	   can	   be	   bad	   –	   so	   repeating	   one	   action	   again	   and	   again	   i.e.	   choosing	   one	   alternative	   repeatedly	   over	  
others	   would	   be	   expected	   to	   reduce	   the	   subsequent	   “positives”	   such	   that	   beyond	   a	   certain	   point	   the	   curve	  
sketched	   by	   an	   utility	   function	   would	   be	   expected	   to	   stop	   rising	   and	   eventually	   head	   downwards	   (as	   the	  
“positives”	  turn	   into	  “negatives”	  due	  to	  an	  overdose).	  So	  utility	  curves	  must	  be	  rising	  to	  the	  right	  of	  origin	  (i.e.	  
have	   positive	   slopes)	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   they	   must	   be	   rising	   in	   diminishing	   marginal	   increments.	   Any	  
preference	  ranking	  that	  has	  the	  properties	  of	  completeness	  and	  transitivity	  may	  be	  formally	  represented	  via	  
a	  utility	  function	  so	  long	  as	  the	  number	  of	  alternative	  choices	  is	  finite	  (Mas-­‐Collel,	  Whinston	  and	  Green,	  1995).	  
In	  the	  presence	  of	  explicit	  restrictions	  under	  which	  certain	  courses	  of	  action	  may	  be	  taken	  by	  the	  individual,	  any	  
economic	  decision	  problem	  adopting	  the	  RCM	  devolves	  to	  a	  mathematical	  problem	  of	  constrained	  optimization.	  
In	  its	  most	  basic	  form,	  RCM	  assumes	  that	  the	  results	  from	  the	  actions	  are	  certainly	  known.	  In	  an	  extended	  RCM,	  
‘uncertainty’	   is	   introduced	   in	   the	   outcomes	   and	   we	   enter	   the	   realms	   of	   ‘expected	   values’.	   Under	   such	   an	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extended	  version,	  a	  probability	  value	   is	  assigned	  to	  the	  result	   from	  each	  of	  the	  available	  alternative	  courses	  of	  
action.	  As	  the	  individual	   is	  bound	  to	  take	  one	  of	  the	  courses	  of	  action	  (since	  taking	  no	  action	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  
alternatives),	   the	   set	   of	   alternative	   courses	   of	   action	   is	   a	   mutually	   exhaustive	   set	   such	   that	   the	   separate	  
probabilities	  sum	  to	  unity	  thus	  constituting	  a	  valid	  probability	  distribution.	  Then	  the	  expected	  utility	  function	   is	  
obtained	  as	  a	  sum	  of	  the	  product	  of	  each	  result	  (measured	  in	  some	  units	  of	  value)	  with	  its	  associated	  probability;	  
summed	  over	  all	  the	  available	  courses	  of	  action	  for	  which	  the	  results	  can	  be	  objectively	  measured.	  It	  is	  here	  that	  
matters	   can	   get	   particularly	   intriguing.	   To	   illustrate	   let	   us	   consider	   a	   ‘game’	  where	   an	   individual	   player	  would	  
have	  to	  perform	  a	  daredevil	  act	  e.g.	  driving	  fast	  along	  a	  narrow,	  mountainous	  road	  in	  the	  dark	  without	  headlights	  
in	  order	  to	  get	  to	  a	  very	  large	  monetary	  reward	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  road	  if	  the	  player	  can	  make	  it.	  If	  the	  player	  is	  an	  
extremely	  skilled	  driver	  then	  he/she	  stands	  a	  reasonably	  good	  chance	  of	  pulling	  it	  off	  and	  getting	  the	  prize.	  But	  
even	  the	  world’s	  best	  driver	  would	  run	  a	  finite	  risk	  of	  failing	  to	  make	  it	  and	  having	  a	  serious	  or	  even	  fatal	  accident.	  	  
In	  such	  an	  event	  the	  expected	  utility	  function	  will	  break	  down	  as	  one	  of	  the	  probable	  results	  is	  an	  infinite	  loss	  (i.e.	  
death)	  no	  matter	  how	  small	  the	  associated	  probability.	  Even	  then;	  there	  would	  be	  a	  few	  people	  who	  would	  be	  
willing	  to	  take	  up	  such	  a	  challenge	  (Nofsinger,	  2002).	  If	  they	  decided	  to	  take	  up	  the	  challenge,	  such	  players	  would	  
thereby	  be	  acting	  irrationally	  in	  contravention	  of	  the	  predictions	  of	  expected	  utility	  theory.	  Although	  it	  is	  a	  rather	  
extreme	  decision	  scenario,	  this	  anecdotal	  example	  helps	  to	  illustrate	  the	  lacuna	  of	  an	  expected	  utility	  paradigm.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
It	   is	   only	   in	   the	   last	   three	   decades	   or	   so	   that	   the	   role	   of	   “irrationality”	   in	   human	   decision-­‐making	   has	   been	  
receiving	   a	   fair	   deal	   of	   attention	  mainly	   owing	   to	   the	   ground-­‐breaking	  work	   of	   Kahneman	   and	   Tversky	   (1979)	  
where	  they	  postulated	  their	  prospect	  theory	  as	  a	  formal	  departure	  from	  the	  expected	  utility	  theory	  paradigm	  of	  
RCM.	  A	  few	  years	  following	  that	  Hershey,	  Kunreuther	  and	  Schoemaker	  (1982)	  observed	  that	  a	  choice	  between	  
the	  same	  pair	  of	  certain	  and	  risky	  results	  was	  largely	  determined	  by	  whether	  the	  decision	  was	  represented	  as	  a	  
"gamble"	   when	   the	   individuals	   displayed	   risk-­‐seeking	   behaviour,	   or	   as	   an	   "insurance"	   when	   they	   suddenly	  
became	  risk	  averse.	  	  The	  next	  two	  decades	  were	  clearly	  dominated	  by	  the	  behaviorists	  and	  behavioral	  economics	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gained	  a	  strong	  foothold	  within	  the	  academic	  ramparts	  as	  a	  sub-­‐field	  of	  both	  economic	  as	  well	  as	  the	  behavioral	  
sciences.	  Although	  Schultz	  (2008)	  has	  criticized	  prospect	  theory	  by	  claiming	  that	  it	   lacks	  a	  coherent	  framework,	  
Kahneman	   and	   Tversky’s	   work	   has	   to	   be	   credited	   with	   having	   opened	   Pandora’s	   Box	   by	   firmly	   establishing	  
behavioral	  economics	  as	  a	  recognized	  discipline.	  Loewenstein	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  have	  in	  fact	  argued	  that	  human	  beings	  
are	  inherently	  “fallible	  creatures”	  and	  not	  the	  perfect	  maximizers	  of	  utility	  as	  assumed	  by	  the	  neoclassical	  utility	  
theory;	   and	   as	   such	   any	   study	   of	   economic	   decision-­‐making	   as	   a	   subset	   of	   overall	   human	   behavior	   should	  
therefore	  borrow	  extensively	  from	  the	  discipline	  of	  psychology	  which	  recognizes	  and	  explores	  human	  fallibility.	  	  
	  
Human	  behavior	   is	   extremely	   difficult	   to	  measure	   and	  over	   the	   ages	   economists	   have	   been	   preoccupied	  with	  
developing	   mathematical	   techniques	   to	   devise	   fantastic	   theories	   and	   make	   lofty	   predictions	   without	   ever	  
bothering	  to	  measure	  thoughts	  or	   feelings	  directly.	  The	  birth	  of	  behavioural	  economics	  made	   it	  quite	  plausible	  
for	  economists	  to	  actually	  gain	  a	  better	  handle	  on	  crucial	  but	  highly	  subjective	  issues	  like	  satisfaction,	  happiness	  
and	   guilt	   by	   taking	   recourse	   to	   psychometric	   methods.	   But	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   day	   even	   those	   psychological	  
measures	  have	  now	  started	  to	  be	  brought	  into	  question	  as	  they	  typically	  depend	  on	  the	  veracity	  of	  the	  designed	  
questionnaires,	   the	   accuracy	   of	   participants’	   responses	   etc.	   Indeed	   one	   of	   the	   big	   criticisms	   of	   behavioral	  
economics	  is	  that	  it	  cannot	  empirically	  ratify	  some	  of	  its	  own	  theories	  owing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  measurements	  are	  
either	  impossible	  or	  at	  best	  only	  anecdotal	  observations	  can	  be	  made	  (Camerer,	  Loewenstein	  and	  Prelec,	  2004).	  
It	   is	   against	   this	   backdrop	   that	   “neuroeconomics”	   as	   a	   discipline	   made	   an	   appearance	   and	   is	   making	   rapid	  
progress	  by	  exploring	  methods	  of	  making	  robust	  measurements	  of	  the	  latent	  drivers	  behind	  human	  decisions.	  	  	  
	  
What	  is	  neuroeconomics?	  
Neuroeconomics	  is	  born	  out	  of	  a	  confluence	  of	  physiological,	  behavioral	  and	  social	  sciences	  devoted	  to	  the	  study	  
of	  human	  decision-­‐making	  involving	  pleasure	  (i.e.	  rewards)	  and	  pain	  (i.e.	  risks)	  (Zak,	  2004;	  Clithero	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
That	  economists	  could	   learn	  something	   from	  biologists	   is	  however	  not	  a	  very	  new	   idea	  –	  Simon	  (1979)	  opined	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that	  evolutionary	  theories	  could	  offer	  explanations	  to	  complex	  socio-­‐economic	  phenomena	  that	  seemed	  random.	  
Simon’s	  vision	  essentially	  gave	  birth	   to	   the	   field	  of	  bioeconomics	  –	  a	   field	   that	  was	  subsequently	  enriched	  and	  
expanded	   through	   the	   works	   of	   Hirshleifer	   (1985),	   Landa	   and	   Gheslin	   (1999)	   and	   Reason	   (2000).	   Zak	   (2004)	  
opined	  that	  neuroeconomics	  is	  a	  natural	  extension	  of	  bioeconomics	  into	  the	  domain	  of	  behavioral	  economics	  –	  
while	   bioeconomics	   focuses	   on	   the	   bio-­‐dynamics	   of	   behaviour,	   behavioural	   economics	   focuses	   on	   the	   role	   of	  
psychology	  in	  decision	  processes	  and	  neuroeconomics	  focuses	  on	  the	  mechanisms	  underlying	  choice	  of	  an	  action.	  
In	   terms	   of	   its	   scope	   then	   neuroeconomics	   would	   be	   concerned	   with	   all	   neuro-­‐physiological	   structures,	  
psychological	  constructs	  as	  well	  as	  intuitive	  economic	  logic	  that	  determine	  choice	  from	  a	  finite	  set	  of	  alternative	  
courses	  of	  action	  with	  different	   results	  under	  a	   range	  of	  physical/mental/emotional/environmental	   conditions.	  
Camerer	  (2007)	  has	  stated	  that	  the	  discipline	  of	  neuroeconomics	  can	  even	  act	  as	  an	  important	  source	  of	  insights	  
on	  neuroscience	  experimental	  designs	  as	  the	  complex	  cognitive	  processes	  to	  be	  studied	  within	  neuroeconomics	  
can	  be	  effectively	  grouped	  under	  the	  crisp	  sub-­‐categories	  of	  neuro-­‐anatomic	  and	  neuro-­‐physiological	  events.	  
	  
Camerer,	   Loewenstein	   and	   Prelec	   (2004)	   have	   contended	   that	   most	   human	   decision-­‐making	   has	   two	  
components	  –	  one	  is	  automatic	  (i.e.	  occurs	  spontaneously)	  while	  the	  other	  is	  judgmental	  (i.e.	  non-­‐spontaneous	  
and	   may	   involve	   a	   conscious,	   deliberative	   process).	   Such	   behavior	   is	   produced	   mainly	   by	   the	   coordinated	  
activates	   of	   four	   lobes	   of	   the	   brain	   and	   these	   are:	   (i)	   frontal,	   (ii)	  parietal,	   (iii)	  occipital	   and	   (iv)	   temporal.	   The	  
frontal	   lobes	   play	   crucial	   role	   in	  making	   plan,	   cognitive	   control	   and	   in	   establishing	   coordination	   among	   other	  
lobes	   of	   the	   brain	   to	   produce	   a	   particular	   behavior.	   The	   other	   lobes,	  parietal,	  occipital	   and	   temporal,	   govern	  
motor	  action,	  visual	  processing	  and	  emotion/recognition/memory	  respectively.	  In	  other	  words,	  these	  four	  lobes	  
process/assimilate	   the	   information	   to	  make	  any	  kind	  of	  decision.	   Further,	   as	   argued	  by	  Camerer,	   Loewenstein	  
and	  Prelec	  (2004),	  the	  brain,	  when	  making	  a	  rapid	  decision,	  tends	  to	  ``overwrite”	  past	  knowledge.	  Indeed,	  such	  




It	  has	  been	  observed	  that	  certain	  behaviours	  that	  are	  clearly	  established	  to	  occur	  automatically	  are	  subsequently	  
misinterpreted	   by	   human	   experimental	   subjects	   as	   having	   occurred	   via	   a	   process	   of	   conscious	   deliberation	  
(Wolford,	  Miller	  and	  Gazzaniga,	  2000).	  It	  is	  therefore	  apparent	  that	  although	  a	  decision	  could	  arise	  purely	  out	  of	  
a	  series	  of	  neural	  activities	  that	  are	  entirely	  inaccessible	  to	  the	  cognitive	  process,	  one	  can	  erroneously	  attribute	  
the	  same	  to	  a	  conscious	  act	  of	  cognitive	  deliberation.	  It	  has	  been	  already	  been	  firmly	  established	  that	  economic	  
rewards	  are	   linked	   to	  primal	  drives	   that	  governs	   the	  neural	  pathway	  of	  pleasure	  and	  pain	   (Tobler,	   Fiorillo	  and	  
Schultz,	  2005).	  	  This	  neural	  pathway	  is	  known	  as	  the	  dopamine	  channel	  and	  dopamine	  neurons	  (nerve	  cells)	  have	  
been	  observed	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  reward	  (Drevets	  et	  al.,	  2001);	  and	  evidence	  has	  also	  been	  found	  
for	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  the	  firing	  of	  the	  dopamine	  neurons	  and	  the	  experimental	  subjects	  reporting	  to	  
be	   spontaneously	   feeling	   “upbeat”	   (Volkow	  et	  al.,	   2002).	  This	   is	   significant	  as	  a	   specific	  decision	  could	  be	  pre-­‐
ordained	  given	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  reward.	  
	  
For	  purpose	  of	  illustration	  let	  us	  consider	  a	  decision	  situation	  modelled	  as	  a	  “coordination	  game”.	  A	  coordination	  
game	   is	   game	   theoretic	   decision	   model	   that	   reveals	   the	   effects	   of	   having	   foreknowledge	   of	   an	   opponent’s	  
behaviour.	  The	  most	  crucial	   feature	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  game	  is	  that	   it	   involves	  multiple	  equilibriums,	  which	  may	  or	  
may	  not	  be	   ranked;	  and	   the	  selection	  of	  equilibrium	   is	  a	  big	   issue	   in	   this	   sort	  of	  game,	   in	  particular,	  when	   the	  
game	  does	  have	  ranked	  equilibriums.	  Several	  ways	  have	  been	  proposed	  to	  explain	  the	  selection	  of	  equilibrium	  
among	  which,	  two	  are	  particularly	  prominent.	  The	  first	  one	  proposed	  by	  Harsanyi	  and	  Selten	  (1988)	  focused	  on	  
information	  processing	  which	  may	  provide	  a	  signal	  to	  his	  rival	  player	  in	  selecting	  the	  equilibrium	  strategy;	  while	  
the	   second	  one	   proposed	   by	   Kandori,	  Mailath	   and	  Rob	   (1993)	   is	   based	   on	   “natural	   selection”	   borrowed	   from	  
evolutionary	  dynamics	  where	   focus	   is	  made	  on	  each	  agent’s	   learning	  behavior.	   It	  may	  also	  possible	   to	  explain	  
such	   selection	   of	   equilibrium	   with	   the	   help	   of	   neuroeconomics.	   We	   strongly	   suspect	   that	   a	   neuroeconomics	  
approach	   could	   provide	   a	   strong	   support	   to	   the	   proposition	   of	   Kandori,	  Mailath	   and	   Rob	   (1993),	   where	   they	  
allow	  for	  a	  given	  probability	  of	  making	  mistake	  in	  the	  individual’s	  learning	  pattern.	  Indeed,	  neuroeconomics	  can	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go	  one	  step	  further	  by	  helping	  to	  explain	  the	  basis	  of	  making	  such	  mistake.	  For	  example,	  one	  can	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  
the	  brain’s	  overwriting	  previous	  information	  that	  leads	  us	  to	  make	  a	  mistake.	  The	  following	  provides	  an	  example:	  
	  
Let	  us	  imagine	  that	  two	  persons	  have	  separately	  set	  out	  for	  a	  walk	  through	  the	  forest	  when	  they	  suddenly	  come	  
face	  to	  face	  with	  a	  bear	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  They	  can	  either	  choose	  to	  run;	  or	  stand	  their	  ground	  and	  try	  to	  scare	  
off	  the	  bear.	  If	  both	  of	  them	  stand	  their	  ground	  they	  can	  very	  likely	  scare	  off	  the	  bear	  and	  that	  way	  they	  will	  both	  
escape	  unhurt.	  Let	  1	  represent	  the	  outcome	  of	  escaping	  unhurt.	  However	  if	  only	  one	  of	  them	  decides	  to	  run	  for	  it	  
(and	  escapes	  unhurt),	  the	  one	  who	  stays	  back	  will	  be	  badly	  mauled.	  Let	  0	  represent	  the	  outcome	  of	  getting	  badly	  
mauled.	   If	   they	  both	  decide	   to	   run	   for	   it	   the	  bear	  will	   charge	  and	  the	  slower	  of	   the	   two	  will	  get	  badly	  mauled	  
while	  the	  faster	  will	  escape	  unhurt.	  Therefore,	  each	  person	  faces	  two	  outcomes	  with	  equal	  probability	  –	  escaping	  
unhurt	  (probability	  ½)	  or	  getting	  mauled	  badly	  (again;	  probability	  ½).	  Therefore,	  his	  expected	  payoff	   from	  such	  
strategy	  will	  be	  {(½)	  x	  (1)}	  +	  {(½)	  x	  (0)}	  =	  ½.	  The	  resultant	  payoff	  matrix	  is	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  1	  below.	  
	  
INSERT	  FIGURE	  1	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
	  
The	  above	  game	  has	  two	  equilibriums	  (½,	  ½)	  and	  (1,	  1)	  and	  clearly	  these	  equilibriums	  are	  Pareto-­‐ranked,	  where	  
(1,	   1)	   is	   Pareto-­‐dominant.	   It	   would	   appear	   from	   the	   above	   payoff	  matrix	   (which	   has	   been	   depicted	   from	   the	  
viewpoint	  of	  Person	  1)	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  foreknowledge	  about	  Person	  2’s	  chosen	  action	  he	  would	  decide	  to	  
run	   for	   it	   as	   that	  would	  maximize	  his	   own	   chance	  of	   escaping	  unhurt.	   Indeed,	   the	   strategy	   ‘run	   for	   it’	   is	   each	  
agent’s	  weakly	  dominant	  strategy.	  If	  they	  apply	  a	  rational,	  deliberative	  process	  they	  ought	  to	  stick	  together	  and	  
stand	  their	  ground	  to	  maximize	  the	  chances	  of	  both	  escaping	  unhurt.	  But	  when	  in	  such	  a	  helpless	  and	  obviously	  
highly	  stressful	  situation,	  human	  decisions	  are	  rarely	  deliberative	  and	  are	  rather	  “spur	  of	  the	  moment”	  acts	  with	  
no	   cognitive	   components	   at	   all.	   	   It	   could	  of	   course	  be	   that	   the	   “spur	  of	   the	  moment”	  decision	   comes	  out	   the	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same	  as	  the	  one	  that	  would	  have	  been	  taken	  if	  a	  cognitive	  process	  was	  employed.	  However	  it	  could	  quite	  easily	  
be	  a	  different	  one	  as	  well.	  The	  point	  is,	  spontaneous	  decisions	  are	  processed	  within	  our	  brains	  and	  we	  have	  little	  
or	  no	  control	  over	  what	  we	  decide	  in	  such	  circumstances	  as	  the	  brain	   is	  on	  auto-­‐pilot.	   In	  such	  circumstances	  it	  
would	  be	  of	  course	  helpful	  to	  know	  what	  underlying	  latent	  mechanisms	  are	  involved	  that	  would	  actually	  govern	  
the	   decision-­‐making	   rather	   than	   a	   deliberative	   process	   over	   which	   the	   decision	   maker	   has	   control.	   This	   is	  
precisely	  where	  neuroeconomics	  purports	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  a	  big	  contribution	  to	  the	  decision	  sciences.	  	  Indeed,	  
though	  the	  choosing	  the	  strategy	  `run	  for	  it’	  is	  weakly	  dominant,	  given	  the	  threatening	  circumstances	  of	  facing	  a	  
wild	  bear,	  neuroeconomics	  suspects	  that	  the	  Pareto-­‐dominant	  equilibrium	  (1,	  1)	  is	  not	  very	  likely	  to	  be	  attained.	  	  
	  
Methodology	  of	  neuroeconomics:	  challenges	  and	  opportunities	  
It	  would	  appear	  that	  a	  heavily	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  subject	  like	  neuroeconomics	  would	  have	  a	  plethora	  of	  adoptable	  
methodologies	   that	   it	   can	  choose	   from	  and	  call	   its	  own.	  However	   things	  are	  not	   that	   simple.	  The	  main	  hurdle	  
stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  three	  major	  contributing	  disciplines	  –	  economics,	  psychology	  and	  physiology	  rarely	  
see	  eye-­‐to-­‐eye	  with	  each	  other!	  Economists	  have	  always	  preferred	  to	  keep	  matters	   involving	  human	  emotions	  
and	   feelings	   out	   of	   the	   purview	   of	   their	   somber	   mathematical	   models.	   That	   didn’t	   actually	   endear	   them	   to	  
behavioral	  scientists	  seemingly	  derisive	  of	  anything	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  able	  to	  exist	  independent	  of	  human	  frailties.	  	  
And	  the	  hitherto	  unresolved	  “mind	  versus	  matter”	  debate	  hasn’t	  really	  helped	  the	  cause	  with	  physiologists	  and	  
psychologists	   continually	   in	   conflict	   over	   whether	   our	   brains	   are	   in	   charge	   of	   our	   minds	   (as	   the	  
neurophysiologists	   would	   have	   us	   believe)	   or	   whether	   it	   is	   our	  minds	   that	   are	   ultimately	   in	   charge	   of	   nearly	  
everything	  (as	  the	  cognitive	  psychologists	  would	  like	  to	  view	  things).	  The	  result	  is	  that	  although	  proponents	  from	  
all	   the	   three	  major	   contributing	  disciplines	   agree	   that	   they	  must	   all	   come	   together	   to	   address	   the	  problem	  of	  




However	  some	  common	  grounds	  have	  been	  cemented	  and	  there	  is	  hope	  of	  further	  consolidations	  in	  the	  future.	  
The	   burgeoning	   growth	   of	   “experimental	   economics”	   is	   arguably	   the	   most	   promising	   development	   in	   recent	  
times	   that	   reflect	   an	   obvious	   influence	   of	   the	   bio-­‐behavioral	   sciences	   on	   the	   accepted	  methods	   of	   economic	  
enquiry.	   	  While	   it	   is	  still	  an	  open	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  social	  sciences	  (and	  economics	  is	  still	  a	  social	  science)	  
can	  ever	  be	  as	  amenable	  to	  laboratory-­‐based	  experimental	  studies	  as	  natural	  sciences,	  there	  are	  some	  obvious	  
merits	  of	  being	  actually	  able	  to	  “keep	  everything	  else	  unchanged”.	  	  However	  the	  biggest	  issue	  is	  whether	  staged	  
social	  experiments	  conducted	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  a	  contrived	  setting	  are	  truly	  reflective	  of	  the	  real	  goings-­‐on?	  
Nevertheless	  economists	  have	  picked	  up	  a	  lot	  of	  experimental	  methods	  in	  recent	  times	  from	  behavioral	  sciences.	  
And	   this	   augurs	   well	   for	   the	   future	   of	   neuroeconomics	   as	   it	   will	   of	   course	   entail	   a	   lot	   more	   laboratory	  
experimentation	  than	  any	  other	  field	  of	  economics	  as	  it	  tries	  to	  look	  inside	  the	  ultimate	  black	  box	  –	  human	  brain.	  
	  
Any	   consistent	   and	   reliable	   data	   that	   directly	   relates	   to	   the	   underlying	   processes	   as	   they	   are	   brought	   to	   light	  
contributes	  both	  to	  better	  theorization	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  to	  better	  means	  of	   falsifying	  theories;	  and	  this	   is	  
one	  of	  the	  reasons	  behind	  rapidly	  growing	  	  acceptance	  of	  neuroeconomic	  studies	  (Cacioppo	  and	  Nusbaum,	  2003).	  	  
Brain	   imaging	   studies	   using	   real-­‐time	   functional	   magnetic	   resonance	   imaging	   (fMRI)	   is	   a	   well-­‐accepted	  
methodological	  approach	  that	  is	  quite	  specific	  to	  neuroeconomics	  (Sanfey	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Khoshnevisan	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
Image	   construction	   in	   fMRI	   depends	   on	   varying	   rates	   of	   relaxation	   among	   the	   biological	   tissues	   due	   to	   their	  
intrinsic	   nature.	   Put	   simply,	   after	   the	   removal	   of	   an	   applied	  magnetic	   field	   the	   alignment	   of	   	   hydrogen	   in	   the	  
water	  molecules	   present	   in	   the	   various	   biological	   tissues	   returns	   exponentially	   to	   its	   original	   state	   during	   the	  
relaxation	  process	  with	  varying	  rates	  –	  	  T1,	  T2	  and	  T2*	  (Logothetis,	  2008).	  	  T1-­‐weighted	  images	  use	  a	  gradient	  echo	  
sequence	  with	  short	  echo	  and	  repetition	  times,	  resulting	  in	  a	  contrast	  between	  grey	  and	  white	  matter.	  T2	  uses	  a	  
long	   echo	   time	   and	   repetition	   time,	   where	   water	   appears	   brighter	   and	   biological	   tissue	   appears	   darker.	  
Therefore,	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  relaxation	  rates	  necessarily	  reveal	  the	  anatomy	  of	  the	  brain,	  and	  because	  of	  the	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dynamic	  nature	  of	  the	  brain	  tissue,	  these	  variations	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  time	  changes	  during	  the	  composition	  
of	  the	  images,	  also	  called	  T2*-­‐	  weighted	  imaging,	  which	  is	  really	  the	  base	  process	  in	  generating	  	  fMRI	  images.	  
	  
	  By	  applying	  brain	   imaging	  techniques	  to	  study	  economic	  decision-­‐making,	   researchers	  are	  able	   to	  break	  down	  
the	   inherent	   processes	   and	   mechanisms	   underlying	   the	   choice	   of	   a	   specific	   action	   from	   within	   a	   set	   of	  
alternatives	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  its	  structural	  (i.e.	  biological)	  as	  well	  as	  cognitive	  (i.e.	  behavioural)	  components.	  The	  
usual	  pattern	  of	  such	  experiments	   involves	  taking	  brain	   images	   in	  real	   time	  of	   the	  experimental	  subjects	  while	  
they	  are	  engaged	  in	  some	  specific	  decision-­‐making	  task.	  The	  fMRI	  images	  reveal	  the	  exact	  sections	  of	  the	  brain	  
that	  are	  most	  active	  while	  performing	  the	  given	  tasks	  and	  some	  of	  the	  findings	  can	  indeed	  be	  quite	  surprising.	  	  
	  
For	  example,	  Sanfey	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  did	  an	  fMRI	  imaging	  study	  of	  experimental	  subjects	  who	  received	  either	  fair	  or	  
unfair	  monetary	  offers	  in	  an	  ultimatum	  game.	  They	  found	  that	  when	  players	  received	  unfair	  offers	  there	  was	  a	  
high	  activity	  observed	  in	  the	  insular	  cortex	  (a	  section	  of	  the	  brain	  which	  generates	  feelings	  of	  revulsion)	  as	  well	  as	  
in	   the	   anterior	   cingulate	   cortex	   (a	   section	   of	   the	   brain	   that	   is	   heavily	   involved	   in	   cognitive	   processing).	   The	  
distinctive	  patterns	  on	  the	  fMRI	  images	  were	  indicative	  of	  the	  subjects	  trying	  to	  reconcile	  between	  their	  feelings	  
of	  revulsion	  at	  having	  been	  given	  an	  unfair	  offer	  with	  their	  want	  for	  whatever	  monetary	  reward	  was	  there	  to	  be	  
had.	  	  If	  the	  insular	  cortex	  activity	  was	  more	  active	  than	  the	  anterior	  cingulate	  cortex,	  the	  subject	  would	  be	  seen	  
to	  end	  up	  rejecting	  the	  unfair	  offer.	  Khoshnevisan	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  conducted	  fMRI	  imaging	  of	  experimental	  subjects	  
while	  they	  were	  engaged	   in	  three	  tasks	  of	  varying	  monetary	  risk	   levels.	  They	  found	  that	  risky	  choices	  and	  risk-­‐
seeking	  mistakes	  were	   both	   preceded	   by	   activation	   of	   a	   section	   of	   the	   brain	   called	  nucleus	   accumbens,	  while	  
both	   riskless	   choices	   and	   risk-­‐aversion	  mistakes	  were	   preceded	   by	   activation	   of	   a	   different	   section	   called	   the	  
anterior	   insula.	  These	  results	  were	  consistent	  with	  the	  hypotheses	  that	  the	  nucleus	  accumbens	   represents	  gain	  




While	   experimental	   studies	   in	   neuroeconomics	   could	   also	   make	   use	   of	   other	   available	   neuro-­‐physiological	  
measurement	  techniques	  e.g.	  magnetoencephalography	   (MET)	  and	  positron	  emission	  tomography	   (PET),	  by	   far	  
most	  experimental	  studies	  have	  relied	  on	  some	  form	  of	  MRI	  due	  to	  better	  spatial	  resolution	  (Wager	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  
With	  the	  continuing	  development	  of	  modern	  neuro-­‐imaging	  methods,	  it	  is	  now	  increasingly	  becoming	  possible	  to	  
accurately	   relate	   specific	   cognitive	   processes	   to	   the	   latent	   neural	   activities	   that	   go	   on	   inside	   the	   brain	   and	  
thereby	  understand	  which	  decisions	  (and	  to	  what	  extent)	  are	  under	  the	  cognitive	  control	  of	  the	  decision	  maker.	  
This	   is	   definitely	   an	   improvement	   over	   traditional	   psychometric	   methods	   of	   measuring	   behaviour	   as	   neuro-­‐
physiological	  measurements	  essentially	  carry	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  validity	  compared	  to	  conventional	  behavioural	  
measurements	  because	  the	  former	  offer	  more	  direct	  and	  unmediated	  measures	  (Cacioppo	  and	  Nusbaum,	  2003).	  
	  
Conclusion:	  is	  neuroeconomics	  for	  real	  or	  is	  it	  only	  in	  our	  heads?	  
Levine	   (2003)	  has	  argued	   in	  defence	  of	  RCM	  that	  predicting	  economy	   is	  not	   like	  predicting	   the	  weather	  –	  and	  
that’s	  the	  reason	  why	  one	  should	  expect	  markets	  to	  follow	  the	  path	  that	  people	  fear	  them	  to	  follow.	  If	  people	  
fear	   that	   the	  market	  will	   crash	   they	  will	   start	   offloading	   (selling	  off)	   their	   assets.	   If	   a	   large	  enough	  number	  of	  
people	  believe	   in	   that	   fear	   then	   there	  will	  be	  enough	  selling	  pressure	  created	   to	  cause	   the	  market	   to	  crash.	   It	  
does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  market	  mechanism	  per	  se	  has	  failed	  or	  that	  RCM	  couldn’t	  predict	  what	  was	  coming	  –	  it	  is	  
rather	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy	  that	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fundamental	  economic	  forces	  and	  mechanisms.	  
However	  one	  could	  turn	  Levine’s	  argument	  on	  its	  head	  and	  use	  it	  to	  attack	  the	  RCM	  that	  he	  has	  sought	  to	  defend.	  	  
If	  RCM	  is	  something	  that	  is	  pre-­‐destined	  to	  fail	  in	  the	  face	  of	  reality	  aren’t	  we	  better	  off	  looking	  somewhere	  else?	  	  
	  
Levine	  (2003)	  also	  argues	  against	  neuroeconomics	  questioning	  the	  need	  for	  having	  such	  a	  discipline	   in	  the	  first	  
place	  as	  according	  to	  him	  it	  wouldn’t	  really	  help	  to	  answer	  questions	  regarding	  human	  behaviour	  any	  more	  than	  
a	   knowledge	   of	   the	   inside	   of	   a	   CPU	   would	   help	   a	   computer	   programmer	   to	   write	   a	   better	   software	   code.	  
However	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	   is	   the	  software	  code	  will	   in	  effect	  be	   interacting	  with	  the	  underlying	  hardware	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and	  without	  any	  knowledge	  of,	  for	  example,	  the	  speed	  of	  the	  processor	  or	  the	  amount	  of	  available	  RAM	  space	  
etc.	   one	   could	   not	   effectively	   write	   a	   software	   code	   without	   running	   into	   issues	   at	   the	   time	   of	   compilation.	  
However,	  analogies	  with	  the	  computer	  aside,	  it	  is	  important;	  as	  we	  have	  discussed	  in	  an	  earlier	  section,	  to	  know	  
whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  is	  a	  decision	  under	  the	  cognitive	  control	  of	  the	  decision	  maker	  and	  is	  not	  automatic.	  
Because	   if	   a	   decision	   is	   automatic	   i.e.	   it	   does	   not	   internally	   involve	   a	   deliberative	   process;	   then	   how	   can	   one	  
shape	  such	  a	  decision	  so	  as	  to	  maximize	  some	  measure	  of	  expected	  utility	  within	  (or	  even	  without)	  a	  given	  set	  of	  
constraints?	  There	  is	  obviously	  a	  need	  to	  identify	  whether	  a	  decision	  is	  under	  the	  decision	  maker’s	  control	  before	  
one	   can	   run	   it	   through	   any	   RCM-­‐type	   optimization	  model.	   If,	   as	   is	   known	   to	   be	   the	   case	  with	   the	   dopamine	  
channel,	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  ‘stimulus’	  would	  always	  make	  an	  individual	  feel	  enough	  “upbeat”	  to	  put	  all	  his	  savings	  
into	  junk	  bonds	  then	  no	  amount	  of	  mathematical	  analysis	  or	  economic	  theorizing	  can	  influence	  such	  a	  choice!	  	  
	  
The	   pertinent	   question	   then	   is	   approximately	   what	   proportion	   of	   our	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   economic	   decisions	   can	   be	  
ascribed	   to	   the	   internal	   “hard	   wiring”	   of	   our	   neural	   connections	   and	   endocrinal	   system?	   Also	   within	   those	  
decisions	  that	  are	  seemingly	  available	  to	  our	  cognitive	  faculties	  to	  be	  subjected	  to	  “soft	  analysis”,	  which	  ones	  are	  
we	  really	  deliberating	  on	  and	  which	  ones	  just	  entail	  spurious	  deliberations?	  It	  seems	  that	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  
future	  research	  efforts	  in	  the	  neuroeconomics	  area	  will	  need	  to	  be	  devoted	  to	  answer	  these	  types	  of	  questions.	  
Neuroeconomics	  has	  a	  lot	  of	  methodological	  commonalities	  with	  computational	  neuroscience	  and	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  
of	   scope	   for	   mutual	   enrichment.	   An	   interesting	   methodological	   approach	   to	   computationally	   simulating	   the	  
processes	   of	   economic	   decision	  making	   in	   the	  human	  brain	  was	  developed	  by	  O’Reilly	   and	  Munakata	   in	   2000	  
when	   they	  developed	  an	  Artificial	  Neural	  Network	   (ANN)	  model	  of	   the	  basal	  ganglia	   (BG).	   This	   computational	  
model	   was	   subsequently	   improved	   and	   used	   in	   a	   number	   of	   cognitive	   situation	   studies	   (Frank,	   Loughry	   and	  
O’Reilly,	  2001;	  Norman	  and	  O’Reilly,	  2003;	  Frank,	  Rudy	  and	  O’Reilly,	  2003;	  Atallah	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Frank,	  2005;	  Frank	  
and	   Claus,	   2006	   and	   Frank	   and	   O’Reilly,	   2006).	   	   The	   extended	   model	   developed	   by	   Frank	   (2005)	   includes	   a	  
competing	  process	  of	  the	  indirect	  pathway,	  from	  the	  striatum	  to	  the	  external	  segment	  globus	  pallidus	  (GPe),	  to	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the	   internal	   segment	  globus	  pallidus/substantia	  nigra	  pars	   reticulata	   (GPi/SNpr);	  previous	  models	  did	  not	   take	  
into	  account	   these	   segments.	   Frank’s	  model	  also	   covers	   substantia	  nigra	  pars	   compact/ventral	   tegmental	  area	  
(SNpc/VTA)	  and	  allowed	  a	  complete	  simulation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  neuro-­‐modulator	  dopamine	  (DA)	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
However	   the	  most	   significant	   contribution	   to	  knowledge	   from	  advances	   in	  neuroeconomics	   could	  come	   in	   the	  
unlikely	   form	   of	   cures	   to	   diseases	   like	   dementia	   and	   also	   successful	   rehabilitation	   following	   traumatic	   brain	  
injuries.	   Although	   not	   directly	   related	   to	   clinical	   neurology,	   exploratory	   neuroeconomics;	   especially	   via	  
experimentations	   using	   real-­‐time	   brain	   imaging	   techniques	   on	   complex	   choice	   behavior;	   could	   help	   to	   gather	  
information	  about	  the	  functioning	  of	  healthy	  human	  brain	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  capabilities	  of	  high-­‐end	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
Several	   neurological	   conditions	   are	   related	   to	   a	   dysfunctional	   DA,	   such	   as	   Parkinson’s	   disease,	   attention	  
deficit/hyperactivity	   disorder	   (ADHD)	   and	   Schizophrenia.	   By	   modelling	   the	   dysfunctional	   areas	   of	   the	   brain,	  
researchers	  can	  better	  understand	  the	  role	  these	  regions	  play	  in	  a	  healthy	  brain	  (Cools	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Frank,	  2005;	  
Frank	  and	  Reilly,	  2006).	  Such	  information	  could	  be	  used	  to	  set	  up	  an	  ANN	  model	  where	  researchers	  could	  ‘switch	  
off’	   certain	   sections	   (corresponding	   to	   damaged	   areas	   of	   the	   brain)	   and	   see	   the	   effect	   on	   decision	   quality.	   It	  
would	  potentially	  reveal	  the	  sections	  of	  the	  brain	  where	  most	  of	  our	  high-­‐end	  decisions	  devolve	  and	  in	  case	  of	  
damage	  to	  those	  sections,	  could	  reveal	  alternative	  neural	  pathways	  that	  could	  be	  assigned	  some	  of	  those	  tasks.	  	  
It	  is	  our	  view	  that	  neuroeconomics	  has	  a	  definite	  role	  to	  play	  in	  a	  better	  and	  more	  complete	  understanding	  of	  the	  
human	  decision	  making	  processes	  in	  general	  and	  economic	  decision	  making	  processes	  in	  particular.	  It	  is	  literally	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Figure	  1:	  Payoff	  matrix	  for	  a	  2x2	  coordination	  game;	  the	  payoffs	  are	  shown	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  row	  player	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